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This paper considers racial profiling in traffic stops as a public policy problem.   
Efficiency and equity considerations are characterized.  I argue that while there is a 
strong argument that racial profiling produces a violation of fairness, specifically in the 
treatment of innocent black motorists, the efficiency effects of profiling are not known.  
One cannot assign probabilities to the possible magnitudes of either deterrent effects or 
the harms of profiling to individuals.  This makes the assessment of profiling an 
example of decisionmaking under ambiguity. I defend a notion of a “Fairness 
Presumption” that requires a policymaker to be able to make an affirmative case if a 
policy is to be implemented that induces unfairness.  On this basis, I reject racial 
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Racial profiling continues to be a contentious issue in American society. While 
official policing policies have in many places banned profiling, the impact of such 
regulations is unknown.  This paper is designed to consider some of the general issues 
that need to be addressed in evaluating racial profiling as a public policy question.   
While there is a growing body of theoretical and empirical work on profiling (John 
Knowles, Nicola Persico, and Petra Todd (2001), Persico (2002), Jeffrey Dominitz 
(2003)), with the exceptions of Mathias Risse and Richard Zeckhauser (2004) and 
Bernard Harcourt (2004), relatively little attention has been paid to integrating efficiency 
and equity considerations in an overall assessment. The issues discussed here are 
analyzed in greater detail in Steven Durlauf (2005). 
The main theme of this discussion is that the public policy evaluation of racial 
profiling may be thought of as an example of decisionmaking under ambiguity in that 
the available evidence on profiling does not speak to the probabilities that are needed to 
engage in standard statistical decision theory arguments.  For concreteness, I will only 
discuss profiling in the context of police traffic stops where the intent is to identify drug 
carriers.  By focusing on a specific case, the force of abstract arguments may be better 
evaluated.  I place the discussion in the context of efficiency/equity tradeoffs; these may 
be translated into more standard (from the perspective of philosophy) welfarist or 
deontological considerations; this is done in Durlauf (2005). 
I consider a population with fraction k of blacks. Let G  and I  denote guilt and 
innocence,  B  and W  denote black and white, and   denote a traffic stop. The overall 
stop rate C is taken to be fixed. A stop strategy is a pair of stop probabilities 
S
() SW Pr  
and  ( Pr SB )  consistent with C, 
 
  () ( ) ( ) 1P r P r kS W k S B −+ C = . (1) 
 
By profiling, I refer to the case where  ( ) ( ) Pr SB SW > Pr . 
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2. Efficiency  
 
Efficiency in stop strategies requires specification of costs and benefits to 
individuals, so that expected welfare effects for the population as a whole may be 
calculated.  As a first approximation, I equate efficiency with minimization of  ( ) G Pr , 
the aggregate crime rate. If the crime rate of one group only depends on its own stop 
rate,   may be written  ( Pr G)
 
  ()( ) ( ) ()( ) ( ) Pr 1 Pr ,Pr Pr ,Pr Gk G W S W k G B S =− + B . (2) 
 
Assuming standard conditions on the first and second partial derivatives of the race-
specific crime rates with respect to stop rates, a profiling strategy is efficient relative to a 
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a result obtained in Persico (2002) and Dominitz and Knowles (2004).  Intuitively, if the 
marginal reduction in crime for an increase in the stop rate for blacks is higher than 
whites at the race neutral rate, crime minimization requires a shift of stops towards 
blacks.  
  The costs to individuals of racial profiling have two aspects.  The first has to do 
with the harms inflicted on individuals by stops.  Here, I only focus on the effects of 
stops on the innocent, so  () , SIW Pr  and  ( ) Pr , SIB determine the extent of these 
costs.  Further, one can posit the existence of social costs associated with strategies 
where stop rates differ across races.  Glenn Loury (2002) argues that the major 
impediment to racial equality in America is stigma rather than overt discrimination.  As 
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I interpret Loury, stigma is the systematic tendency to ascribe the least favorable view to 
individuals of a group consistent with available information.  If racial profiling 
contributes to their stigmatization, it induces costs to blacks in spheres far outside the 





  The equity dimension of racial profiling revolves around the extent to which a 
profiling strategy is consistent with some conception of justice; in examining this I am 
deviating from welfarist arguments. One justice claim that may be reasonably applied 
here concerns fairness in treatment by the government.  That being said, the notion of 
fairness requires delineation. One would not, for example, wish to argue that a 
policymaker should not use a technology that makes it easier to identify one group of 
criminals versus another.  These types of problems are discussed in the literature on 
equality of opportunity. In that literature, exemplified by John Roemer (1998), fairness 
requires that individuals not be held responsible for things outside their control but may 
be held responsible for factors for which one holds an individual responsible.  In the 
profiling context, this leads to the idea that fairness requires equal treatment of the 
innocent with respect to race,  
 
  ( ) ( ) Pr , Pr , SIW SIB =  (4) 
 
Fairness in the treatment of the innocent is not necessarily violated by profiling.  








Pr Pr , Pr ,
Pr Pr Pr
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=  (5) 
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 measure the effectiveness of the police in 
identifying innocent blacks and whites.  Profiling can be consistent with equal treatment 
of the innocent if the policy reflects the ability to relatively accurately identify guilty 
black drivers. Of course, fairness issues still arise in comparing the stop rates for 
innocent blacks and whites once one also conditions on those factors that produce the 





While it is straightforward to provide an algebraic representation of the 
efficiency and equity considerations for profiling, a public policy evaluation, of course, 
requires the assignment of magnitudes to the various factors I have discussed. The main 
theme I wish to argue is that assessments of benefits and costs are both subject to 
ambiguity in the sense that there is no basis for assigning probabilities to these 
magnitudes.  
In terms of the benefits of profiling, the basic problem is that available empirical 
studies do not identify the effects of profiling studies on crime. The existing empirical 
literature is exemplified by Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) who find for Maryland 
data that under profiling 
 
  () ( ) Pr , Pr , I SW ISB = . (6) 
 
This condition is consistent with arrest maximization by the police.  Arrest 
maximization does not equate to crime minimization when the crime rate of the 
oversampled group exhibits relatively less sensitivity to the stop rate.
2 
As for costs, there is virtually no empirical literature that allows for an 
assessment of magnitudes, specifically with respect to the disproportionate burden 
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placed on innocent blacks by profiling.  With respect to private costs, Risse and 
Zeckhauser (2004) suggest that the harms of traffic stops are small in the sense that a 
stop is but one of many racial incidents experienced by blacks.  Durlauf (2005) disputes 
this claim and argues that the marginal harm is increased by the occurrence of other 
racial incidents; racism is a background in which racial profiling is especially hurtful to 
blacks.  For our purposes, what matters is that these costs cannot be quantified based on 
current knowledge.  Similarly, we have no credible empirical evidence on profiling and 
stigma.  One objection is that in isolation, profiling may have little effect on the overall 
stigma experienced by blacks.  This objection is unpersuasive since it really suggests a 
need to think about the costs and benefits of a portfolio of profiling policies; one does 
not want to dismiss the harms of one discriminatory practice because the presence of 
many others renders the one relatively unimportant.  A stronger objection is that there is 
little quantitative evidence on the effects of stigma on socioeconomic outcomes.     
Adducing such evidence is closely related to the question of identifying discrimination 
effects; James Heckman (1998) shows how deep identification problems plague causal 
claims of differential treatment by race, as occurs when stigma effects are present. 
  The assessment of profiling is thus an example of decisionmaking under 
ambiguity.  As such, standard decision theory cannot be applied to problems of this type. 
Much of the exciting work in economics on model uncertainty and policy evaluation 
involves efforts to overcome this problem using criteria such as minimax (Lars Hansen 
and Thomas Sargent (2004)) or minimax regret (Charles Manski (2004)). This type of 
analysis resolves model uncertainty by choosing a particular model (or weighted average 
of models).  For the policies described here, one similarly cannot assign probabilities to 
elements of the decision problem such as the effects of a profiling strategy on crime.  
Further, objects such as the least favorable model are not well defined given the absence 
of a quantitative description of preferences over equity and efficiency and the absence of 
a well defined support for the space of possible models.  Hence, other principles need to 
be appealed to in order to engage in policy evaluation. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
2Dominitz and Knowles (2004) are developing methods to identify the crime rate effects 
of profiling which, if successful, will address this problem. 
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In Durlauf (2005) I argue, for policy problems such as racial profiling, that 
ambiguity may be resolved by requiring that there exists a burden of proof to justify 
policies that, whatever our notion of fairness, diminish it by their implementation.  This 
is formalized as a Fairness Presumption: 
 
A government policy that violates fairness in its treatment of individuals is 
presumed to be wrong and hence requires an affirmative defense.  The burden 
of proof is on the advocate of the policy to argue that the violation meets other 
social goals in a way to overcome the violation. 
 
I will not make a defense of this presumption here, except to note that it represents an 
effort to embody in adjudication procedures some notion of an “assumption of moral 
equality between persons” (Thomas Nagel (1979) p. 111). Nagel argues persuasively 
that this equality assumption underlies both liberal and conservative views of justice, 
with differences related to how to interpret it. 
In the profiling context, the Fairness Presumption leads to the conclusion that 
profiling is not justified since there is no affirmative case to be made in terms of 
efficiency whereas there is an unambiguous fairness violation, i.e. differential treatment 
of innocent blacks and whites. The crime minimization benefits are not identified by 
available data and potential costs exist that cannot be assumed to be small. In contrast, it 
seems that current profiling policies embody a clear violation of fairness. The Persico, 
Knowles, and Todd (2001) results, for example, imply that the stop rates for innocent 
blacks must exceed whites given the oversampling of blacks unless  () () Pr Pr I BI > W , 
which would be very surprising given the general tendency of crime rates to be higher 
among blacks than whites. At a minimum, I would argue that the burden of proof is on 
someone to show that a profiling strategy is driven by the relative ability to identify 
guilty blacks in a way to fulfill (5).  The absence of an affirmative case for efficiency (as 
I have defined it) means, given the unfairness of profiling that it should be rejected in 
the case of traffic stops. 
The Fairness Presumption is an example of a strategy to resolve ambiguity by 
focusing on ways to restrict the decision rules of the actors. This strategy is used by 
Truman Bewley (2002) who, in his analysis of Knightian uncertainty, introduces an 
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inertia assumption that in essence renders decisions path dependent; from an initial 
decision, one does not adjust unless there is a reason to do so.  The Fairness Presumption 
similarly rejects policies that violate fairness unless there is a persuasive reason to do so.  
One such reason could be derived from Rawls’ Difference Principle, under which a 
policy that increases inequality is justified if it improves the welfare of the worst person.  
Another possible reason can be based on utilitarianism, so that an increase in the average 
utility in a population is justified even if fairness is diminished.  The Fairness 
Presumption imposes a weak type of intrinsic value to fairness by requiring that such 
reasons exist in order to justify its diminution.  
The Fairness Presumption itself requires context-specific delineation in order to 
be applied.  To see this, consider college admissions.  Fairness might initially be defined 
as requiring that the probability of admission to college is independent of race once one 
has conditioned on past achievement.  But what if a black student has attended an 
inferior school, something for which he is obviously not responsible?   And what if 
stigma has affected a student’s past effort, so that factors for which we usually hold 
individuals responsible interact with factors outside their control?  The Fairness 
Presumption should be interpreted as a guide to how to engage in policy debate, not a 
substitute for the debate.  As Roemer (1998) discusses, disagreements about the 
appropriate conditioning factors in assessing fairness are inevitable.  However, traffic 
stops do not seem to involve additional factors in the way that, say, college admissions 
and affirmative action do. 
One weakness with this analysis is that I have assumed that the crime rate affects 
blacks and white equally.  Suppose that black and white criminals tend to affect 
members of their own racial groups, so that profiling strategies have implications for the 
distribution of crime victimization across groups. Put differently, a competing fairness 
claim may involve equality of the victimization rates V of the innocent, 
 
  () ( ) Pr , Pr , VIW VIB = . (7) 
 
(Unlike (4), which may be achieved by a random stop strategy, (7) may not be feasible, 
so that the fairness aspect of profiling amounts to minimizing racial differences).  This 
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would imply a role for profiling in achieving fairness in victimization.  However, in such 
cases, an additional burden of proof exists, namely, one must demonstrate that a tradeoff 
between fairness in different dimensions (crime exposure and stops) is necessary.   
Randall Kennedy (1997) argues that racial profiling may be replaced by other police 





This paper makes two claims. First, I argue that the current evidence on profiling 
and guilt rates does not represent the basis for a justification of current racial profiling 
practices.  The effects of profiling on crime rate are ambiguous whereas there is a clear 
fairness violation involved.  Second, there should exist a presumption against profiling 
policies which places the burden of proof on advocates to profiling to demonstrate that 
the efficiency effects are sufficient to overcome the fairness violation.   For policy 
environments where probabilities cannot be sensibly assigned, qualitative arguments of 
this type are probably the best that one can do to resolve ambiguity.  This conclusion is 
frustrating but reflects the complications that are inherent when one moves from 
academia to the policy domain.  
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